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Introduction
As war fighters, we spend much of our career studying the art and tactics of employing overwhelming force. Most of our training is designed to prepare us for the rigors of war, to educate us on enemy capabilities and tactics, and to integrate our units into a joint, technologically superior force that dominates in any conflict. The capabilities that enable that dominance come at a high cost, but ensure our primacy as the most powerful fighting force in history. This ability to wield hard power helped achieve victory in the Cold War and enhances our national security today, but its effectiveness is tempered by the realities of globalization and the emergence of transnational threats.
The current global security environment reveals a less tangible conflict than that of previous generations. Described as a war of ideas, the United States is engaged in struggles around the world that challenge the fundamental principles of democratic society. It is important that the values and ideals that make our nation strong are communicated and shared with the rest of the world through effective foreign policy. Responding to international crises, building capabilities in other countries, and encouraging and training foreign militaries to a professional standard are in the best interests of U.S. national security.
These tools of soft power often have a much greater effect and come at a much cheaper price than combat operations.
The geographic combatant commanders, as key representatives of the U.S. in their respective regions, employ soft power resources to shape regional security and preclude the commitment of forces in combat. They seek to enhance stability by averting crises or minimizing their impact where possible. Gen Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) described his approach to regional security while serving as the commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM): "When I … had the ability to choose between fighting fires or preventing them, I chose prevention. If there was any possible way to make this a less crisis-prone, more secure and stable region, I wanted to try it, through shaping operations." 1 As a high-visibility example of the military being employed in a soft power role, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions have emerged as rewarding operations that are well suited to the capabilities inherent in our military. HA/DR missions have a significant and positive impact on regional security by demonstrating American values, promoting stability in crisis-prone areas, and countering ideological support for terrorism. In this role, the military is necessarily required to integrate in diplomatic and peaceful ways with foreign militaries, other USG agencies, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). That this occurs is not new, but the frequency and the level of integration are increasing; more than ever, the success of the mission requires successful coordination with these entities. Joint doctrine addresses this issue:
Difficulties arise from the fact that many USG agencies, civil and military authorities, foreign governments, the UN, NGOs, and IOs share HA responsibilities. US military…planners must remain cognizant that these various agencies usually fall outside the military "command and control" system. Cooperation and coordination are essential in dealing with these organizations. The strategic goals of all concerned may not be identical, or even compatible. However, thorough coordination and planning with all concerned entities can contribute to successful operations in this complex and challenging environment. The following day, JTF-536 was redesignated Combined Support Force (CSF)-536 to reflect the nature of the mission and the growing list of participants. 12 The DRATs, in each of three countries requesting assistance, quickly expanded and transitioned to Combined Support Groups (CSGs), which were assigned responsibility for coordinating efforts with the governments and militaries of Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Indonesia.
The scope and nature of the mission, coupled with the sudden onset of the disaster, mandated that effective multinational, inter-agency cooperation be quickly established while the CSF was organizing itself and coordinating movements of the sizable military forces enroute to the region. The CCC mission statement characterized this challenge:
CSF-536 Combined Co-ordination Centre [sic] will seek to establish the conditions that will encourage widespread representation, co-ordination and co-operation across the international military and civilian community, avoid operational duplication or complication and inform the intentions of single agencies in order to achieve unity of effort in the international response to tsunami disaster relief operations across the affected region. 13 The critical role of the CCC in bringing together all of the actors in this crisis was described by Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in a report on tsunami relief logistics:
The…CCC at Utapao quickly became the heart of the coordinated international relief effort, with liaison officers from Australia, Britain, Japan, Thailand, and Singapore, along with a Civil-Military Coordination Cell, USAID DART representatives, and a local official from the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). They met several times a day to coordinate their respective national and institutional efforts. This provided an essential element of on-scene coordination that helped to avoid duplication of effort and facilitated accurate assessments of the extent of the damage and identification of the areas most in need of assistance. The CSF's CCC also helped facilitate the efforts of the international "Core Group" (involving the U.S., Australia, Japan, India, Canada, and others) that was established to coordinate the first stages of the international relief effort, identify and fill gaps, and avoid or break logistical bottlenecks, until the United Nations was able to mobilize and play a more central role in the relief response. From the outset, PACOM forces assumed a supporting role to the lead federal agency, USAID, and the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Military objectives were focused on coordinating logistical requirements and meeting the needs of the governments affected by the disaster, as well as supporting the growing number of relief agencies. Lt Gen Blackman explained the capabilities he initially coordinated: "rotary-wing aircraft for distribution; water-making, water-production, storage and distribution capability; some general engineering capability to clear roads and facilitate the relief effort by the host nation or other agencies." 16 Cossa describes the role of the CSGs in Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, which were headed by one-star officers: "They were there to support host nationled efforts, but in most instances provided invaluable managerial and coordinating expertise that might otherwise have gone lacking, while augmenting overstretched local assets." 17 Even as U.S. forces were still arriving in the relief operations area (ROA), commanders began developing an exit strategy, which would require transition criteria for handover of responsibilities to non-military agencies. USPACOM's Execute Order, dated 6
January, included language to that effect in the Commander's Intent: "U.S. forces will limit operations to essential life-sustaining operations and, where feasible, will hand off HA/DR functions to other agencies as soon as practical." 18 Shortly after arriving in Utapao, Lt Gen
Blackman verbalized that mindset when he stated: "We will not stay any longer than necessary, and we will…determine when that time is that we can begin to reduce U.S.
military capabilities in coordination, in consultation with OFDA and with the U.N. When we believe that they are in a position to…sustain the necessary relief for the affected people, then I will make the recommendation that we begin to incrementally reduce our capability." 19 The U.S. military, sensitive to Indonesian concerns about an extended presence, completed its mission in less than two months. Describing the handover to relief organizations, Rear Admiral Crowder, CSG-9 commander, said, "We're reaching a point where there's going to be a transition to sustain relief and not an acute emergency got-tohave-it-now relief that we saw in the first couple of weeks. The timing of the earthquake, just before winter conditions moved into the region, meant that roads and rail lines remained impassable until spring. The unique heavy lift capability of U.S. Army CH-47 Chinooks diverted to Pakistan from operations in neighboring Afghanistan were the primary means of moving supplies to the remote areas cut off by damage from the earthquake. USAID described the Chinook's impact: "Since U.S.
choppers have twice the lifting power and can haul slings without landing or hand loading, the U.S. military delivered the lion's share of the aid." 31 In contrast, the UN rented Mi-8
Hips from Ukraine, which were capable of carrying half the weight Chinooks could carry. Food, water, and medicine delivered to a disaster location, but not distributed to those in need is useless. During disaster relief efforts, access, coverage, and capacity building serve as measures of effectiveness, and are enabled by information sharing between relief providers. 34 Cossa states, "While the numbers of forces dedicated to the relief effort and the extent of aid they provided were impressive, the most invaluable U.S. contribution [to tsunami relief] focused around another Defense Department unique capability: command, control, communications, and coordination. These attributes, critical in wartime, proved equally critical in ensuring an effective, coordinated response." help to move supplies where they were needed, which the pilots would accommodate if possible. 38 While occasionally effective at the tactical level, this ad-hoc method is not efficient enough at the operational level to enable valuable but short-duration participation of military forces sought by all parties in these types of disasters.
Web-enabled communication solutions can be effective if they reside on accessible servers and are updated regularly. During OUA, PACOM's Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) was widely used to share unclassified information by Britain, Canada, Australia and the affected Asian nations while coordinating relief efforts. 39 It is a non .mil web portal (www1.apan-info.net) hosted by PACOM to serve as a collaboration tool for all entities involved in theater security cooperation, multinational workshops and exercises, and crisis/contingency response operations. 40 Previously established for use during military planning and training exercises, its simplicity and accessibility made it vital to daily operations at the CCC.
In the field, however, it is unlikely that consistently reliable communications will be available. Given the state of technology today, voice connectivity is probable, but efficient connectivity relies on broader information sharing and collaboration assets that web access and email provide. The UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) team, a relatively well-funded team of disaster management professionals, deployed to Indonesia during tsunami relief in 2004 with nothing but satellite telephones. As a coordinating body, they endeavor to provide the capability to set up efficient communications system to tie the various relief organizations together. Their lack of equipment and technical support resulted in a six-week delay before Internet access was established across Aceh. The military and humanitarian organizations are often seen as strange bedfellows.
With their vastly different cultures and core missions-one the application of force in the pursuit of defence [sic] of national interests, the other humanitarian relief often in situations where the presence of militaries is a complicating factor-each has historically viewed the other with at least suspicion. 42 NGOs are aware that the military excels in providing immediate assistance, saving lives and relieving suffering, but that understanding is tempered by their doubt of the military's commitment to humanitarian principles. A combatant commander may establish an HA coordination center to assist with early interagency coordination and planning and to provide a link between the command and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies that may be participating in the operation at the theater strategic level... The humanitarian operations center (HOC), normally established by the UN or a relief agency, coordinates the overall relief strategy; identifies logistic requirements for NGOs, the UN, and IOs; and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to a JTF through a civil-military operations center (CMOC) in cases where these organizations have been established. The HOC is primarily an interagency policymaking and coordinating body that does not exercise command and control but seeks to achieve unity of effort. 49 In the absence of reliable information systems, these centers provide common ground for meetings that will be necessary, albeit painful, to synchronize relief activities. Military personnel will likely be frustrated by the ad-hoc nature of inter-organization coordination that exists in the world of NGOs. During tsunami relief, NGOs complained about the quantity and quality of inter-relief organization coordination meetings. Without clarity on the objectives of so many meetings, junior staff members were sent as representatives, but without the authority to make decisions. The lack of consensus that resulted caused decreased efficiency, the exact opposite of the intended purpose for the meetings. 50 Thus the role of the Liaison Officer (LNO) is just as critical in HA as it is in combat operations. In addition to the command and control functions of these coordination centers, they facilitate face-to-face interaction between personnel and can help bridge the cultural and language barriers that will inevitably exist.
Looking Forward
The experience gained in recent large-scale HA/DR missions, coupled with the civilmilitary experiences of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan must be exploited when developing plans for future operations. The UN, through its Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), strives to develop a doctrine-like set of guidelines for UN and NGO participants in humanitarian relief, gathering lessons learned from these experiences and applying them to policy development. 51 For the military's part, doctrine development in this area continues, but will not be enough. The individuals involved in these missions, from the JTF commander, to the helicopter pilot delivering supplies, to the young Marine handing out bottles of water or providing security for civilians, must receive training on the civil-military coordination issues that will arise. Exercises, such as Cobra Gold 52 crises." 53 In order to attain our strategic security objectives in this future environment, and in light of post-conflict experience in the Global War on Terror, our performance alongside international and inter-agency partners is critical. While dominance in the application of hard power remains vital, the nuanced application of the soft power capabilities of our military is equally imperative.
